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BOOK REVIEW
LAND USE REGULATION AND LEGAL
RHETORIC: BROADENING THE TERMS
OF DEBATE
R. S. Radfordt
Property Rights and the Constitution:
Shaping Society Through Land Use Regulation.
By Dennis J. Coyle. SUNY Press:
Albany, New York, 1993. Pp. xvi,
398. $65.50.
Dennis Coyle's new book, Property Rights and the Constitution,'
is an important addition to the ongoing debate over the constitu-
tional status of private property.2 Coyle selectively reviews impor-
tant land use cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
and various states in the post-New Deal era. More importantly,
Coyle provides an ideological framework that illuminates several
key strands in the constitutional jurisprudence of property law.
Coyle traces the ebb and flow of competing attitudes toward prop-
erty rights and regulation in a way that makes sense of the some-
times chaotic body of case law in this field. In the process, he sets
forth his own theories of the vital role of private property in creat-
ing and maintaining the American constitutional system.
The status of private property rights in American jurisprudence
has undergone volatile shifts over time. Individuals' rights to own
and use property were thought to be of fundamental importance at
t Chair of Rental Property Law, Pacific Legal Foundation. B.S.B.A., Rockhurst
College; M.A., J.D., University of Southern California. Mr. Radford authored Pacific
Legal Foundation's amicus curiae brief to the United States Supreme Court in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
1. DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGI-I'S AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCI-
ETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION (1993).
2. For other recent contributions to this debate see, for example, RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985); NICHOLAS MERCURO, TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW
AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1992); JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1991); EL-
LEN FRANKEL PAUL & HOWARD DICKMAN, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1990).
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the time the Constitution was drafted,3 but constitutional protec-
tion of such rights was virtually abolished during the New Deal.4
Recent trends suggest the Court may be giving renewed vigor to
the constitutional defense of property rights. Cases like Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission5 and Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council6 can be read to indicate that government may no
longer rely on boilerplate assertions of "police power" to justify
the de facto confiscation of property through excessive regulation.
This shift in Supreme Court doctrine, however, has not been mir-
rored by the legal literature. With few exceptions,7 legal treatises
and law reviews are dominated by the view that private property
rights do not (or should not) exist. Yet if they do exist, these
archaic claims must not be allowed to thwart the public-spirited
policies of the regulatory state.8
3. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
STRAINTS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIcS 207, 213-16 (1988); GOTTFRIED DIETZE,
IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY, 25-34 (1971); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 42-58
(1992). The Founders included two separate property-related safeguards in the Fifth
Amendment: the Due Process Clause prevents governmental interference with pri-
vate property except by "due process of law" while the Takings Clause provides that
private property may not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
4. The Court's abandonment of meaningful review of economic regulation was
foreshadowed in 1934 in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 530-39 (1934) (upholding
a New York law establishing minimum prices for milk), and became firmly established
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) (holding that eco-
nomic regulation need be no more than reasonably related to some object of legisla-
tive concern).
5. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Justice Scalia in Nollan suggests that the New Deal Court
had abandoned the defense of property rights only in cases arising under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses while maintaining substantive protections
under the Takings Clause. Id. at 834 n.3. This interpretation is not easily squared
with the case law from the half century between West Coast Hotel and Nollan.
6. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
EMINENT DOMAIN (1987).
8. For example, in the past four years the Harvard Environmental Law Review
has not published a single article suggesting that private property rights might place
legitimate constraints on environmental regulation. Positive or even neutral treat-
ment of property rights in student notes has become so rare that an author recently
thought it necessary to include a disclaimer to the effect that his balanced treatment
of this topic did not mean that he was ipso facto an enemy of the environment. See
Timothy G. Warner, Note, Recent Decisions by the United States Claims Court and the
Need for Greater Supreme Court Direction in Wetlands Taking Cases, 43 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 901, 902 n.6 (1992).
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Property Rights and the Constitution, will go a long way toward
restoring balance in this field. Coyle is well aware of the existing
pro-regulatory bias in the literature and expressly sets out to "rem-
edy this by presenting a study that is comprehensive and balanced
.... adding a discordant voice to the harmony of New Deal com-
mentary."9 By and large, he succeeds admirably in this venture.
I. Coyle's Cultures: The Rhetoric of Group and Grid
There is little original in Coyle's observation that land use dis-
putes involve "cultural conflicts in which ideas and values are im-
plicit in different physical arrangements of land use."'" However,
the debate over land use and environmental regulation has been
typically waged in bipolar terms: the "private" interests of prop-
erty owners (usually seeking to develop their land) are opposed by
the "public" interests of the state (usually blocking develop-
ment)." Coyle enriches this dialogue by modeling regulatory dis-
putes as a three-way opposition between competing preference
systems embodying different fundamental values: liberty, equal-
ity, and order.12
These preference systems, or "cultures," are derived from the
interplay of two key dimensions of social orientation designated as
"group" and "grid".' 3 Group denotes the extent to which individu-
als define themselves as members of a collective such that personal
interests are deliberately subordinated to the welfare of all. 4 Grid
refers to the degree to which individual actions and decisions are
seen to be constrained by a network of social rules. 5 The resulting
preference systems are plotted below:
9. COYLE, supra note 1, at 12.
10. Id. at 20.
11. See, e.g., ELAINE Moss, LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-4
(1977); FRANK SCHNIDMAN ET AL., HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE § 1.1.2 (1984).
12. COYLE, supra note 1, at 20.
13. Id. at 281-82 n.3. Group-grid analysis originated in the work of anthropologist
Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS,
CULTURAL BIAS (1978) [hereinafter CULTURAL BIAS]; MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL
SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY (1973) [hereinafter NATURAL SYMBOLS];;
Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural The-
ory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 3 (1987). It should be recognized
(as Coyle acknowledges) that both Douglas and Wildavsky employed the terminology
somewhat differently from Coyle's application.
14. COYLE, supra note 1, at 281 n.3.
15. Id.
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High Grid Low Grid
High Group Hierarchical Egalitarian
Low Group Culture X Libertarian,
Individuals with both high grid and high group orientation tend
to embrace a hierarchical (or authoritarian) worldview; decisions
over land use should be guided by comprehensive regulations pre-
scribed by experts and implemented by political authority. 6 High
group combined with low grid yields an egalitarian culture whose
members strive to maximize the common welfare through group
decision-making without tolerating excessive political direction.' 7
A low-group, low-grid culture is libertarian in outlook, stressing
private ownership and individual autonomy in land use decisions.' 8
An identification problem arises with the fourth category-the
culture of low-group identity combined with high-rule orientation.
The occupants of this quadrant (if it is occupied at all) would be
motivated mainly by personal self-interest, yet would support ex-
tensive social regulation and control over others. Seemingly un-
easy with such a coincidence of values, Coyle dismisses it as
"despotism,' 9 adding only that "[i]t is rarely an important cate-
gory in the analysis of public policy .... 20 Coyle's predecessors in
the development of grid-group analysis have seemed equally ill at
ease with this fourth worldview, which I have designated as "Cul-
ture X".2 '
As descriptions of real-world belief systems, Coyle's cultures are
grossly oversimplified. They have considerable interest, however,
as a means of categorizing and analyzing judicial rhetoric. Regard-
less of whether anyone really believes that land use decisions
should be structured according to hierarchical, egalitarian, or liber-
tarian principles, judges speak as if they do.22 Thus, to a startling
16. Id. at 21-26.
17. Id. at 30-38.
18. Id. at 26-30. Libertarianism does not necessarily exclude cooperative decision-
making but rejects the sacrifice of individual values to promote group welfare. Cf. R.
S. Radford, Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990s: The Death of Rent Control?, 21 Sw.
U. L. REV. 1019, 1054-59 (1992) (Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause limits sacrifices
that can be imposed by majoritarian processes).
19. COYLE, supra note 1, at 281 n.3.
20. Id. at 282 n.3.
21. For Wildavsky, Culture X is "fatalistic," characterized by "apathy." Wildav-
sky, supra note 13, at 6-7. Douglas referred to Culture X as "insulated." CULTURAL
BIAS, supra note 13, at 7, 20-21.
22. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
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degree, the legal discourse of land use regulation can be clarified
and illuminated by the application of Coyle's schema.
Coyle sees the holdings of the California Supreme Court as an
extreme case of the hierarchical approach to land use regula-
tions.23According to Coyle, the California court has-at least in the
realm of land use law-championed a return to a social system
based on status rather than contract,2 4 an essentially feudal order
in which all one's rights and responsibilities flow from the sover-
eign and are determined by one's position in an inflexible social
ordering. 5
Coyle's extensive review of California jurisprudence could be
easily supplemented by anyone who has followed the sorry plight
of property rights in the Golden State. In one recent case not cited
by Coyle, a California appellate panel simply brushed aside a prop-
erty owner's regulatory takings claim against a city, noting that the
policy of California courts has been to "[display] a generally toler-
ant attitude to municipal ordinances in this area. "26 The state
Supreme Court declined to review this holding-and indeed has
declined to review any regulatory takings case in the past fourteen
years.2 7 This surely qualifies as a hierarchical worldview par
excellence!
While the California judiciary has established a firm rule of hier-
archy, the New Jersey Supreme Court has grounded its land use
jurisprudence more on the rhetoric of egalitarianism.28 As exem-
plified by the Mount Laurel decisions,29 the New Jersey court has
overridden both property owners and local governments in its zeal
to "redirect the regulatory power to serve egalitarian ends."3
23. COYLE, supra note 1, at 112-65.
24. Maine perceived that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto
been a movement from Status to Contract." SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 141 (1986 ed.) (1861). In contrast, Coyle quotes former California Supreme
Court Justices Matthew 0. Tobriner and Joseph R. Grodin as advocating (they would
have said "recognizing") a return to a status-bound system. COYLE, supra note 1, at
215-17.
25. COYLE, supra note 1, at 213-37.
26. Bullock v. City and County of San Francisco, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1089
(1990).
27. See Michael M. Berger, Silence at the Court: The Curious Absence of Regula-
tory Takings Cases from California Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 26 Loy. L. REV.
1113 (1993).
28. COYLE, supra note 1, at 61-72, 75-84.
29. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975) (Mount Laurel I); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel II).
30. COYLE, supra note 1, at 84.
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Coyle traces the interplay of New Jersey's egalitarian themes with
the vaguely libertarian rhetoric of the neighboring Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania.3 Any cross-pollenization that may have occurred
between these jurisdictions, however, has not been to the benefit of
property rights. When egalitarian issues are not present in a land
use case, the New Jersey court freely employs the rhetoric of hier-
archy to squelch any libertarian illusions on the part of property
owners.
32
The United States Supreme Court presents the most complex
and intriguing application of Coyle's cultural analysis. 33 Since
abandoning the libertarian worldview in the 1930s, the Court has
pursued at least three distinct rhetorical tracks in its land use deci-
sions. Property rights have been upheld in contexts that advance
egalitarian interests or other aspects of human flourishing unre-
lated to individual rights of ownership and development per se.3 4
Strong protection has been afforded the "new property"-i.e., gov-
ernment grants of entitlement having no basis in traditional prop-
erty rights.35 Meanwhile, within the traditional realm of private
property ownership, the post-New Deal Court has acquiesced in
broad assertions of the police power to abrogate rights supposedly
protected by the Takings and Due Process Clauses.36 This picture
is further complicated by the Court's latest strand of decisions, in
which muted echoes of libertarian rhetoric can be discerned.37
31. Id. at 53-111.
32. A clear example of the New Jersey court's hierarchical fallback position is
Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Commission, 125 N.J. 193 (1991). In Gardner, the
New Jersey court upheld a regulation that imposed a recorded deed restriction on
plaintiff's property, limiting it to agricultural uses. Justice Handler disposed of Gard-
ner's takings claim by quoting from the State Legislature's "finding" that develop-
ment of private property is associated with a plethora of ills, including heightened risk
of forest fires. Id. at 200. Gardner's constitutional rights, along with any recognition
of them by local government, were simply "pre-empted by a higher authority." Id. at
201.
33. COYLE, supra note 1, at 166-209.
34. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). For a succinct ration-
ale for this rhetorical strain, see Michael C. Blumm, Property Myths, Judicial Activ-
ism, and the Lucas Case, 23 ENvTL. L. 907, 916 (1993) ("Property rights protecting
private autonomy are closer to the speech, religion, and association rights that Ameri-
cans hold as fundamental. They are all classic minority rights.").
35. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
36. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning law severely
restricting development of residential property was found not to be a taking); Penn
Central ransportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (holding that economic regulations will be up-
held whenever "it might be thought" that they have some rational basis).
37. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (Holding
that when owner is made to sacrifice economic beneficial use for common good, it is a
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II. The Missing Dimension: Costly Preferences
Having acknowledged the utility of 'Coyle's grid-group analysis
for evaluating judicial rhetoric, it is time to step back and raise
some caveats. The core problem with the cultural preference
model Coyle employs is that the sort of preferences the model
takes into account are not clearly delineated.
Economic theory treats preferences in two subtly different ways:
as determinants of personal choice and behavior, and also as the
basis for value judgments about alternative states of the world.3" A
third distinct preference ordering may apply to decisions over the
choices and behavior of others. For a variety of reasons, the prefer-
ences a person acts on may be different from those he employs in
more global decision-making.39 There are likely to be even sharper
differences between one's preferred distribution of one's own re-
sources and one's choices concerning the property of others.
The relative cost to the evaluator of implementing these prefer-
ence rankings inevitably alters the evaluation. Unfortunately,
Coyle's grid-group preference model abstracts completely from the
allocation and distribution of costs. Group identification and rule
orientation are the only variables taken into account, and the
model's output is taken to be uniform regardless of whether the
resulting preferences are applied to oneself, to others, or to univer-
sal states.
Because of this indeterminacy, the grid-group model has very
limited explanatory value with respect to the preferences expressed
in land use rhetoric. Rhetoric, like ideology, is an economic good;
the lower its cost, the more of it will be produced and consumed. °
Linking expressions of preferences with the costs of implementing
them would predictably reduce expressions of costly preferences.4
By failing to incorporate a cost dimension, the grid-group model is
unable to account for pronounced shifts in apparent regulatory
preferences associated with shifts in the distribution of costs.
taking); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that
California Coastal Commission could not, without compensation, condition grant of
permit on owners' transfer to public of easement).
38. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 Eco-
NOMICA 241, 253 (1973).
39. See id. at 253-59.
40. See Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 191, 195 (1988); Douglas C. North, Ideology and Political/Economic Institu-
tions, 8 CATO J. 15, 26 (1988); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74
VA. L. REV. 339, 352-53 (1988).
41. See Geoffrey Brennan & Jonathan Pincus, Rational Actor Theory in Politics:
A Critical Review of John Quiggin, 63 ECON. REc. 22, 28-29 (Mar. 1987).
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A cautionary illustration of this problem is framed by a case the
Supreme Court had not yet decided when Property Rights and the
Constitution went to press: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.4 2
III. The Lucas Case: Rhetoric Meets Reality
The facts of the Lucas case are by now well known. David Lucas
bought two residential homesites on the Isle of Palms near
Charleston, South Carolina. His intention was to build beachfront
homes on these lots, as every other property owner up and down
the beach had already done. Before construction could begin, the
South Carolina Legislature, citing the value of open beaches to the
state's tourism industry;, adopted a law that prohibited the con-
struction of any permanent dwelling on Lucas's property. Lucas
brought suit for inverse condemnation under the Takings Clause
but was rebuffed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.43
The state court's opinion was a showpiece of the rhetoric of hier-
archy. So impressed were the justices by the Legislature's asser-
tions of "findings" that it set them forth-three single-spaced pages
worth-in full. 4 Against this overwhelming weight of expertise
(one gets the impression the court wanted to decide the issue by
literally weighing the evidence), David Lucas had the temerity to
stand alone and ask for the protection of his constitutional rights.
To the South Carolina court, this was a clear case of bucking the
hierarchy of status and would not be tolerated. The court's posi-
tion was clear: The State and its agents may properly take private
property by regulation "where uncontrolled [private] use would be
harmful to the public interest,"45 and the State itself is to be the
sole determinant of what constitutes the public interest.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Occasionally resort-
ing to mildly libertarian rhetoric, the majority opinion proposes
looking at regulation "from the landowner's point of view."'46 Per-
haps more significantly, the Lucas opinion goes out of its way to
disavow the hierarchical rhetoric that had dominated the Court's
property rights discourse for half a century. 7
42. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
43. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
44. Id. at 896-98.
45. Id. at 901 (quoting Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327,
329 (1984)).
46. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2920.
47. The Court strongly rejected any requirement of deference to legislative au-
thority or expertise noting that, where all beneficial use of property has been taken,
[Vol. XXI420
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Almost immediately, Lucas brought forth a deluge of criticism
from commentators of both the hierarchical and egalitarian persua-
sions. Some of these critics expressed outrage:
Any economic harm suffered by Mr. Lucas is clearly offset by
the public need for the Beachfront Management Act.48
Lucas and his colleagues.., are asking the public to sacrifice the
safety of an entire littoral in order to permit million-dollar play-
houses for the rich.49
Others were scornful:
The [Supreme] Court displayed no appreciation of the factors
that led South Carolina to conclude that the physical character-
istics of Lucas' land made it the wrong place for the construction
of a house.50
Some were downright preachy:
We have become so taken with the pursuit of individual rights
and personal economic gain that we have lost sight of the com-
munity and the social fabric of mutuality and reciprocity without
which our economic and political systems cannot operate.5'
What unified the anti-Lucas rhetoric was its insistence that an indi-
vidual property owner was not entitled to develop his land once the
state (or "community") had expressed a preference that the land
not be developed.
The case was remanded to the trial court, where the parties set-
tled on a fair value and the State purchased David Lucas's land.52
At this point things got very complicated for cultural preference
analysis because as soon as the State of South Carolina assumed
"it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption" that the legislative enactment was
legitimate. Id. at 2894. Such regulations "carry with them a heightened risk that pri-
vate property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm." Id.
48. Janet McClafferty Dunlap, This Land Is My Land: The Clash Between Private
Property and the Public Interest in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 33 B.C. L.
REV. 797, 839 (1992).
49. John M. Payne, Takings and Environmental Regulations, 21 REAL EST. L.J.
312, 320 n.35 (1993).
50. Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1411, 1422 (1993). Lazarus goes on to scold the Court for "its ignorance of the poten-
tial fragility of land." Id. at 1423.
51. Judith M. LaBelle, Takings Law in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 73, 83 (1992).
52. See Michael M. Berger, Environmental Protection? It Depends on Who Is Pay-
ing, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 11, 1993, at 7.
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the costs of property ownership, it put the land up for sale-for the
development of residential homes !53
Coyle's grid-group model is unable to explain such a sudden,
radical shift in regulatory preferences. We have no reason to be-
lieve that cultural attitudes evolved, in so short a time, toward
more libertarian sentiments 4.5  The legislative determination re-
mains intact that there is an essential public interest in keeping Mr.
Lucas's former property undeveloped. The State's experts have
not retracted their finding that the lots in question are totally un-
suited for home construction. When Mr. Lucas proposed to build
homes'on these sites, the State regulators portrayed him as a threat
to the public health, safety, and well being of the entire Charleston
area. Yet the moment those same regulators were required to bear
the cort of their preferences, they determined that developing the
property was the only sensible course of action. After insisting for
four years that the public interest required David Lucas to write off
the million dollars he had invested-in his property, the government
suddenly found the paramount issue to be that "the state has to
recoup the money it paid to buy the lots. '55
Radical preference shifts such as the one demonstrated in this
case can be incorporated into grid-group analysis by adding an eco-
nomic dimension to the model, as suggested above.56 The regula-
tors' preferences concerning the development of someone else's
property were just different from those dealing with property the
state had bought and paid for. This should hardly seem surprising
so long as we remember that even state governments are not ex-
empt from the laws of economics.
It is more challenging to account for the fact that there has been
no outpouring of hostile rhetoric condemning South Carolina's de-
cision to develop the two homesites. Does this speak to the
strength and authenticity of the cultural preferences behind the vi-
tuperative rhetoric directed at David Lucas and his Supreme Court
case? Or does it suggest that land use preferences are influenced
not just by a "mine-thine" dichotomy of ownership but also by
whether the title to land is held privately or by the state?
A distinction of this kind is clearly compatible with hierarchical
culture, which regards individuals as equally incompetent to ques-
tion the state's decisions regardless of whether the authorities de-
53. Id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
55. See Berger, supra note 52.
56. See supra, text accompanying notes 38-40.
422
9 LAND USE REGULATION
cide to develop or to forbid development. However, such
deference is not consistent with the egalitarian component of the
anti-Lucas rhetoric-not, at least, if Coyle's model has correctly
identified modern egalitarianism as a low-grid culture.
In the end, one is forced to wonder whether Coyle's grid-group
analysis has misidentified much of the opposition to private devel-
opment. In particular, it is tempting to return to the mysterious
Culture X and reconsider Coyle's assertion that this low-group,
high-grid culture has little influence on land use policy.5 7 It is
widely recognized that imposing restrictive regulations on other
peoples' resources can be a lucrative source of private economic
rents.5 8 The pursuit of economic self-interest by seeking to impose
regulatory burdens on others can plainly be attributed to a Culture
X worldview. Since pro-regulatory rhetoric emanating from Cul-
ture X is not based on consistent principle or ideology, and there is
little anticipated payoff in appealing to the state to regulate itself,
these voices could be expected to fall mute when the State of South
Carolina took over David Lucas's property. From this perspective,
the otherwise inexplicable silence that greeted the final resolution
of the Lucas case can be seen as a logical implication of the modi-
fied grid-group model.
IV. Conclusion
Property Rights and the Constitution would be a welcome addi-
tion to the literature if it did no more than eschew the slavish cele-
bration of the regulatory state that has become de rigueur in this
field. In fact the book rises well aboVe this threshold, transcending
the standard analysis of land use regulation and, in so doing, signif-
icantly broadening and enriching the debate.
The major element that is missing from Coyle's analysis is an
explicit recognition of economic costs and incentives. It may turn
out that such a dimension completely dominates the cultural pref-
erence model. More likely, it will be found that optimal, positive
amounts of hierarchical and egalitarian preferences would exist
even if their advocates were forced to bear their own costs.59
It will be especially interesting to see whether inquiries along
these lines can shed new light on Culture X preferences and their
57. See supra text accompanying note 20.
58. See, e.g., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M.
Buchanan et al., eds., 1980).
59. Cf. North, supra note 40, at 27 ("[ildeological conviction would be significant
even if all the players paid the price of their conviction . . ").
1994]
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role in policy determination. If effective procedures can be found
to require the beneficiaries of restrictive property regulations to
bear the costs of such measures, a major advocacy group-the oc-
cupants of Coyle's low-group, high-grid quadrant-might disap-
pear from the arena of land use disputes altogether. Such a happy
prospect more than justifies the social scientists' traditional call for
further research.
